Moody reported in 2013 in paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. Vietnam possesses untapped mineral resources in the form of rare earth elements, which are found together with naturally occurring radioactive materials including uranium. Given that Vietnam’s stated national strategic goals regarding mineral wealth, outlined in the 2010 Mineral Law, call for increased exploration and exploitation of mineral resources to improve Vietnam on the socio-economic plane, and further noting that Power Master Plan VII of 2011 lays out an ambitious plan to increase nuclear power-generating capacity from zero to 10.1% of total power output by 2030, there is cause to consider whether the two objectives could be linked.
World markets for rare earth elements are at present a near-monopoly controlled by China, and it is becoming ever clearer that alternative sources for these elements are necessary; this is what Vietnam has to offer. Vietnam does not have the domestic capacity to produce its own nuclear fuel; providing an avenue for obtaining these fuels from domestic uranium ore associated with rare earth element extraction is what an outside state actor – perhaps the United States – could bring to the table.
The author concluded that the information presented in the preceding discussion highlights some of the potential courses of action which states wishing to cooperate with Vietnam in developing its untapped rare earth mineral resources could take. It is clear that Vietnam is committed to REO mining, and its cooperative ventures with foreign partners – particularly with Japan – demonstrate the significant opportunity for foreign state actors to reduce their dependence on Chinese rare earth supplies through investment in Vietnam’s developing rare earth mining sector. In the same way, Vietnam’s robust plan for growing a domestic nuclear-power program through technical cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States presents an important opening for foreign firms to engage in sales of nuclear-power technology and uranium fuel.
Both of these commercial opportunities point towards a nexus of U.S. strategic interests: promoting safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies vis-à-vis Vietnam’s nuclear ambitions as well as promoting sales of American technology and LEU fuel; and the possibility of reducing dependence on China as the sole source for REEs essential to our national defense supply chain. It is to be hoped that the United States does not let this opportunity pass by.
The author recommended that: