Peter Lang presents evidence of the disruption of a transition from fossil fuels to nuclear power, and finds the benefits forgone as a consequence are substantial. Learning rates are presented for nuclear power in seven countries, comprising 58% of all power reactors ever built globally. Learning rates and deployment rates changed in the late-1960s and 1970s from rapidly falling costs and accelerating deployment to rapidly rising costs and stalled deployment.
Historical nuclear global capacity, electricity generation and overnight construction costs are compared with the counter facts that pre-disruption learning and deployment rates had continued to 2015. Had the early rates continued, nuclear power could now be around 10% of its current cost. The additional nuclear power could have substituted for 69,000–186,000 TWh of coal and gas generation, thereby avoiding up to 9.5 million deaths and 174 Gt CO2 emissions. In 2015 alone, nuclear power could have replaced up to 100% of coal-generated and 76% of gas-generated electricity, thereby avoiding up to 540,000 deaths and 11 Gt CO2. Rapid progress was achieved in the past and could be again, with appropriate policies. Research is needed to identify impediments to progress, and policy is needed to remove them.
He concludes that from 1954 to the late-1960s, learning rates of nuclear power OCC were positive (i.e., OCC decreased as capacity increased). In the late-1960s, learning rates turned negative (i.e., OCC increased as capacity increased) and have remained negative ever since in all the seven countries analysed, except South Korea. The disruption to learning rates was followed by stalled deployment rates. If the pre-1970s learning rates had continued, and assuming the actual deployment did not change,OCC of nuclear power in 2015 could have been around 5 to 15% of what it actually was.If both the pre-1970s learning rates and the Linear or Accelerating deployment rates had continued,OCC in 2015 could have been around 2 to 10% of actual.If deployment had continued to add 30 GW to global capacity per year since 1985, 69,000 TWhof extra nuclear electricity could have been generated. Assuming this replaced coal-fired electricity generation, 4.2 million deaths and 69 Gt CO2 may have been avoided.
If deployment had continued from 1976 at the Accelerating rate that prevailed from 1960 to 1976, 186,000 TWh of extra nuclear electricity could have been generated. Assuming this extra nuclear generation replaced coal- and gas-powered electricity generation, 9.5 million deaths and 174 Gt CO2 may have been avoided. In 2015 alone, assuming electricity demand was unchanged, nuclear could have replaced between 49% of coal-powered generation (at the Linear deployment rate) and 100% of coal-powered plus 76% of gas-powered generation (at the Accelerating deployment rate), thereby avoiding between 273,000 and 540,000 deaths and between 4.5 and 11 Gt CO2.
The policy implications are substantial. Benefits would be available in the future by returning to the pre-disruption learning and deployment rates. To achieve this requires a recognition of the disruption and its consequences, identification of its causes, and amelioration of the impediments that are slowing progress.