Pavel Podvig, with contributions by Nikolay Arkhangelskiy, Anatoli Diakov, Anton Khlopkov, Dmitry Konukhov, Dmitry Kovchegin, and Eugene Miasnikov of the Research Report No. 16 International Panel on Fissile Materials report that highly-enriched uranium presents a unique challenge from the nuclear security point of view. Because of its nuclear properties, HEU can be used relatively easily in a simple nuclear explosive device; it, therefore, poses significant danger with regard to potential use by non-state actors [read terrorists] or states with limited nuclear weapon expertise. Moreover, the material is widely used in a range of non-weapon military and civilian applications, such as naval and research reactors or critical research facilities, which makes it vulnerable to diversion or loss. Substantial amounts of HEU are constantly moving through the fuel cycle, creating constant nuclear security risk.
Civilian research facilities, which may lack sufficient protection, are the most problematic, but military uses of HEU also carry with them substantial nuclear security risks.
Understanding of the inherent security risks associated with the continuing use of HEU and of the nuclear proliferation risks associated with these activities helped initiate
an international effort, led by the United States and supported by many states, to reduce the use of HEU in civilian applications. Over the last few decades, this effort
has made significant progress in removing HEU from research facilities throughout the world and reducing the number of countries that have access to the material. Further
progress in HEU minimization will critically depend on the participation of Russia, which currently operates more HEU facilities than the rest of the world combined and
is committed to continue to use the material in a wide range of applications.
Russia has never declared the size of its HEU stock, nor has it disclosed detailed information about the facilities that use the material. Independent estimates suggest that
it has about 680 tons of HEU, although this number is characterized by a very large uncertainty of about 120 tons. About 160 tons of HEU is probably in assembled nuclear
weapons, active as well as those in reserve and awaiting dismantlement. An equivalent of about 25 tons of 90% HEU is believed to be in use in the naval fuel cycle, primarily in the cores of operational naval reactors. Most of the remaining 500 tons of HEU appears to be in the custody of Rosatom and may be stored in bulk form or in weapon components.
As of April 2017, Russia operated 58 facilities that use HEU. This number includes research reactors, critical assemblies, isotope production and power reactors, as well as
naval prototypes. This is more than half of the 115 such HEU facilities that are operating globally. In addition, Russia has a fleet of 58 nuclear-powered ships with nuclear
reactors that use HEU fuel. Although Russia’s nuclear complex has significantly reduced its consumption of HEU in the last two decades, it still requires a large amount of
highly-enriched uranium to operate.
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