In May 1961, just as Kennedy had decided that NASA should put the U.S. on the moon, the U.S. Air Force released a secret report, summarizing the result of years of planning to place a military base on the moon by 1967. As you read through the Lunex project report, it is interesting to note the following.
1. If Project Lunex had been pursued instead of Apollo, the U.S. would have ended the sixties with a launch vehicle very similar to the Shuttle, solid rocket boosters, a Lox by LH2 core, a lifting re-entry vehicle.
2. This clearly could have provided a better basis for follow-on programs than Apollo did. The USAF launch vehicle studies of the late 1960's again came up with a very similar configuration, and NASA finally came to the same conclusion for the Shuttle design as well.
3. One advantage of the Lunex booster is that it also provided a heavy-lift launch vehicle in the pure cargo version. In this report you will discover the reason for USAF support of development of the advanced and large rocket engines begun in the late 1950s the large solid rocket motors. The RL-10, designed for the USAF from the beginning as a throttleable motor for the Lunex lunar lander, finally put this capability to use 20 years later in the DC-X VTOL vehicle.
4. The schedule was extremely over-optimistic. First lunar landing was by the end of 1966, while the booster and vehicle were considerably more advanced than the Apollo approach. Examples include the Lox by LH2 in the lunar landing stages, including throttleability and months-long lunar hibernation times between engine restarts Mach 35 lifting body re-entry vehicle
5. Computer data storage capabilities and technologies not even achieved today
6. Electrostatic gyro platforms (not perfected until the late 1970s in the B-52s SPN-GNS platform) 7. In hindsight it is apparent that increasing Air Force preoccupation with the Viet Nam War in the same period would have resulted in the program stretching and ended.
Managed & Built by I2M Consulting, LLC | © 2010-
