Bowen and Dabbar reported mid-2022 that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to considerable sanctions being levied against Russia.[1] The nation is a major energy supplier to the world—including of oil, gas, coal, and nuclear fuel and reactors—and its energy sector is one area that has already been targeted. Since the war began, some members of the US Congress have called for banning imports of enriched uranium from Russia as soon as 2022 or as late as 2026.[2a and 2b] This commentary discusses Russian involvement in the Western (meaningNorth America, Europe, Japan, and South Korea) nuclear power supply chain, particularly in the United States, as well as policy options to reduce—or end—that involvement.
International Nuclear Fuel Dependencies on Russia
Russia has exported more reactors in recent decades than any other major supplier. In 2021, there were 439 total nuclear power reactors in operation: 38 of them resided in Russia and 42 of them in operation in other countries were of the Russian VVER type (15 of which were in Ukraine). At the end of 2021, 15 Russian-designed reactors were under construction in other nations.
Even for countries that do not host VVERs—including the United States—Russia is a major supplier of several services involved with the manufacturing of nuclear fuel (illustrated in Figure 1). In brief, to make nuclear fuel, raw uranium must be mined out of the ground and milled into uranium-oxide (U3O8) before being shipped to facilities that convert it into uranium-hexafluoride (UF6), which is suitable for enrichment.
Gas centrifuge plants are the type of enrichment facility in use today, where a single centrifuge will take an input stream of UF6 and produce two output streams: one with a higher percentage of the isotope U-235 than the input stream, and a second with a lower percentage of U-235. Enrichment plants can have thousands of centrifuges, and those centrifuges are connected to one another in different ways depending on the company’s goals. Ultimately, an enrichment plant will produce a stream of uranium that is enriched to the desired level (e.g., U-235 content enriched to between 3 percent and 5 percent for use in nuclear power plants) as well as other streams at lower enrichment levels.
In the final step of nuclear fuel making for US power plants, the enriched UF6 is sent to fuel fabrication facilities where it is converted into UO2 and fabricated into fuel pellets. Those pellets are stacked inside metal fuel rods that are connected to each other as part of a fuel assembly, and power reactor cores have many fuel assemblies inside of them.
[Read on. A very informative, well-documented paper]
Notes and References for Archiving:
[1] Richard Nephew, “The Sanctions War Is Just Beginning: Targeting Russia Was the Easy Part,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-31/sanctions-war-just-beginning.
[2] For example, Senator Barrasso introduced legislation with several cosponsors to ban Russian uranium imports 45 days after enactment: https://www.barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/3/barrasso-leads-bill-to-ban-russian-uranium-imports
Senator Manchin and Senator Risch introduced legislation that would not allow Russian LEU imports as of 2026: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4064
.
[3] For the purposes of this paper, “Western” means North America, Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
[4] “US conversion plant gears up for next 40 years,” World Nuclear News, April 14, 2021, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-conversion-plant-gears-up-for-next-40-years.
[5] ConverDyn, HALEU Workshop, April 28–29, 2020, https://gain.inl.gov/HALEU_Webinar_Presentations/10-Critchley,ConverDyn,Rev1-28Apr2020.pdf.
[6] Euratom Supply Agency, “Annual Report 2020,” table 6 on page 22, https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/publications/esa-annual-reports_en.
[7] “Russia’s Tenex wins tender for fuel supply to South Korea,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 25, 2020, https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussias-tenex-wins-tender-for-fuel-supply-to-south-korea-7653727.
[8] “Enrichment excess is here to stay,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 13, 2015, https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureenrichment-excess-is-here-to-stay-4691321/.
[9] Westinghouse, “VVER,” https://www.westinghousenuclear.com/operating-plants/nuclear-fuel/vver.
[10] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “A Transparent Success: ‘Megatons to Megawatts’ Program,” Science & Technology Review, April/May 2013, https://str.llnl.gov/content/pages/april-2013/pdf/4.13.3.pdf
[11] International Trade Administration, "2020 Amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation," Federal Register, October 9, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/09/2020-22431/2020-amendment-to-the-agreement-suspending-the-antidumping-investigation-on-uranium-from-the-russian.
[12] US Department of Commerce press release, “U.S. Department of Commerce Finalizes 20-Year Amendment to the Suspension Agreement on Uranium from the Russian Federation,” October 6, 2020, https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/10/us-department-commerce-finalizes-20-year-amendment-suspension-agreement.html.
[13] USEC was the private entity created from the DOE’s enrichment operation. See: https://www.centrusenergy.com/who-we-are/history/.
[14] Centrus, 2020 Annual Report, https://investors.centrusenergy.com/static-files/77087849-8051-4919-a125-d0a8600bcc98.
[15] For example, DOE announced cost-share awards with TerraPower and X-energy on October 13, 2020, US Department of Energy press release, “U.S. Department of Energy Announces $160 Million in First Awards under Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program,” October 13, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/us-department-energy-announces-160-million-first-awards-under-advanced-reactor.
[16] Nuclear Energy Institute letter to Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, July 5, 2018, https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/letters-filings-comments/letter-perry-haleu-20180705.pdf.
[17] Nuclear Energy Institute, “Establishing a High Assay Low Enriched Uranium Infrastructure for Advanced Reactors,” January 2022, https://www.nei.org/resources/reports-briefs/establishing-a-haleu-infrastructure-for-advanced-r.
[18] See comments by the French enrichment company, Orano, in “Certainty of demand key to HALEU supply, says Orano,” World Nuclear News, March 15, 2022, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Certainty-of-demand-key-to-HALEU-supply-Orano.
[19] US Department of Energy, “Request for Information (RFI) Regarding Planning for Establishment of a Program To Support the Availability of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) for Civilian Domestic Research, Development, Demonstration, and Commercial Use,“ Federal Register, December 14, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/14/2021-26984/request-for-information-rfi-regarding-planning-for-establishment-of-a-program-to-support-the.
[20] For example, the Nuclear Energy Institute’s response is here: https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/letters-filings-comments/NEI-02-14-22_DOE_HALEU-RFI-Response.pdf.
[21] S.4064 and S.4066 from the 117th Congress would support domestic HALEU production.
[22] “Centrus receives licence for HALEU production,” World Nuclear News, June 15, 2021, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Centrus-receives-licence-for-HALEU-production.
[23] Rosatom, “Performance of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom in 2019,” https://www.report.rosatom.ru/go_eng/go_rosatom_eng_2019/rosatom_eng_2019.pdf?msclkid=a5334dd3cf9f11ec964dc636df2b47ef.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Costs In Context,” November 2021, https://www.nei.org/resources/reports-briefs/nuclear-costs-in-context.
[26] Richard Milne, “Finnish group abandons plans for Russia-backed nuclear power plant,” Financial Times, May 2, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/5e7730b5-be55-48a5-8f55-f67d6fb80d77.
[27] For example, fuel development for VVER-440 has been underway. See: “Westinghouse fuel assemblies delivered to Rovno NPP,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 22, 2021, https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newswestinghouse-fuel-assemblies-delivered-to-rovno-npp-8919297.
[28] Westinghouse, “Westinghouse and NT-Engineering Sign MoC to Increase Nuclear Reactor Power,” September 22, 2021, https://info.westinghousenuclear.com/news/westinghouse-and-nt-engineering-sign-moc.
[29] US Department of Energy press release, “DOE Establishes $6 Billion Program to Preserve America’s Clean Nuclear Energy Infrastructure,” February 11, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-establishes-6-billion-program-preserve-americas-clean-nuclear-energy-infrastructure.
[30] US Department of Energy, “Notice of Availability: American Assured Fuel Supply,” Federal Register, vol. 76, no. 160, August 18, 2011, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-08-18/pdf/2011-21067.pdf.
[31] “Public Comments on Behalf of the Ad Hoc Utilities Group,” September 25, 2018, page 17, https://www.regulations.gov/document/BIS-2018-0011-0245: “In addition, on average, nuclear generators allow for lead times of 1.7 years for contracts involving various stages of the fuel cycle.”
[32] Energy Futures Initiative, “The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler,” August 2017. https://energyfuturesinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/02/The-U.S.-Nuclear-Energy-Enterprise_A-Key-National-Security-Enabler_Report_August-2017.pdf
[33] Nuclear Innovation Alliance, “Catalyzing a Domestic Commercial Market for High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium,” April 2022, https://www.nuclearinnovationalliance.org/catalyzing-domestic-commercial-market-haleu.
Managed & Built by I2M Consulting, LLC | © 2010-
