Wilton published his Master's Thesis in late 2012. Traditional energy forecasting envisions a rapid increase in energy demand. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the world energy demand may increase up to 47 per cent by 2035 if we continue along the current line already formally adopted and implemented policies. If we assume the introduction of some new measures, on a relatively cautionary basis, the IEA predicts that the energy demand increase could be reduced to 36 per cent. The so-called 450 Scenario, in line with current modelling practices and taking into consideration expected changes in the energy mix, suggests a maximum increase of around 22 per cent. In other words, according to the IEA, unless we introduce more potent new energy saving measures on top of the already announced policy commitments, chances are we will be falling short of our GHG mitigation goal despite the advances in energy efficiency and policy made in previous years.
Although, the Global Energy Assessment does not agree with the IEA in terms of scenario development, its report also conveys the message that if we are to have a chance of limiting global warming to 2°C, a rapid reduction in global CO2 emissions from the energy sector is required [2]. In order to close the gap governments are faced with multiple possibilities on how to restructure their energy policies. Some of the options mentioned by the GEA are:
(1) expanding the renewables portfolio,
(2) improving energy efficiency,
(3) modernizing fossil fuels; for example by stimulating the commercial deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) or
(4) by revitalizing or expanding the share of nuclear power in the energy mix.
At present (2012), nuclear energy constitutes a significant share (about 5%) of the world’s total primary energy supply [3]. Consequently, without nuclear energy our current CO2 emissions would, most likely, have been an equivalent percentage higher, depending on the replaced fossil fuel source. The argument can therefore be made that increasing our reliance on nuclear energy can further the global ambition to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. When limiting our view to electricity generation, only trace amounts of GHGs are emitted during nuclear power plant operation. When expanding our view to span over the entire lifecycle, only very small amounts of CO2 are emitted as a result of secondary processes like transport and excavation of raw materials.
A publication by Weisser (2006) [4] reported, after having combined numerous figures on the GHG emissions of various electricity generation technologies, that the cumulative lifecycle emissions of nuclear power generation lie between 2.8 and 24 gCO2eq/kWh. This estimate rates nuclear power to have a relatively similar GHG emission level as hydroelectric power (1-34 gCO2eq/kWh) and onshore wind turbines (8-30 g gCO2eq/kWh) [4].
Significant investments in nuclear infrastructure, made in the second half of previous century, have resulted in a large installed electricity generating capacity. This makes nuclear power on par with all but the most established non-GHG emitting energy resource2 and has resulted in a high technological familiarity in a number of countries.
Nuclear power can also contribute to increased national energy security; the addition of nuclear power to a country’s energy portfolio diversifies its power infrastructure and thereby diminishes its dependency on fossil resource imports from foreign countries34. Additionally, undertaking a nuclear construction project might lead to economic growth by means of job creation. Also, depending on certain geographical considerations and assumptions, nuclear power could be more cost effective than alternative forms of lowcarbon electricity generation [5]. Despite all this, the electricity supplied by means of nuclear power has dwindled since 2002, when the number of online reactors reached a maximum of 444 units. Although the total net electrical capacity kept increasing steadily [6], it is expected, following the events in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster [actually not a disaster, but an incident, where no one died or was irradiated] that this trend will come to end (e.g. [7]). Furthermore, for several countries the share of nuclear energy in their electricity mix was already in regress. It is noted in the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010-2011 [8] that the three countries which have phased out their nuclear power completely (Italy, Kazakhstan and Lithuania), together with Armenia had their nuclear peak power production in the 1980s.
Furthermore, several other countries peaked in the 1990s (e.g. Belgium, Canada, Japan and Great Britain) and between 2001 and 2005 an additional seven countries experienced a decrease in their nuclear electricity supply (Bulgaria, France, Germany, India, South Africa, Spain and Sweden) [8]. However, the validity of this statement can be drawn into question considering that these events have only recently occurred and several sources sketch a different picture for Bulgaria [9], India [10] and France [11].
What cannot be denied however is that the current reactor fleet is aging [12]. There are several major problems standing in the way of the renewal of nuclear energy, these include: a short-term manufacturing bottleneck, a shortage of specially trained workers and managers, a skeptical financial sector and public opinion, the latter being of particular importance in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Furthermore, the Global Financial Crisis followed up by European Sovereign Debt Crisis has done nothing but aggravate the situation, in particular for the countries who are currently entertaining the option of starting a nuclear program. Nonetheless, in a recent report the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that no less than 65 had expressed an interest to introduce nuclear power into their energy mix [13]. Of these 65 countries, 21 are in Asia and Pacific region, 21 are located in Africa, 12 are European and 11 are situated in Latin America.
Conventional modelling practice, executed by IEA, forecasts that by 2035 the share of generation from nonhydro renewable energy sources (e.g. wind, biomass, solar, geothermal and marine) may have increased more than five-fold, from 3% in 2008 to 16% by 2035 [1]. Furthermore, primary energy intensity of the economy is decreasing as a result of, among other things, energy conservation programs [14]. Therefore, when approaching the issue from a system wide perspective, countries planning on implementing nuclear power infrastructure should consider whether a nuclear power approach is compatible with a system dominated by renewables and energy efficiency. It is suggested in reference [8] that such co-dominance is not possible. The first argument given is that overcapacity kills efficiency incentives. Large, centralized power-generation units like nuclear power plants (NPPs), are inclined to produce structural overcapacities, which will usually lead to lower electricity prices.
These will discourage energy efficiency, because consumers tend to over-consume in times of resource abundance, which is inefficient. In other words, it is viewed that the power output of a typical NPP is too large. Another disadvantage of their size is that in the case of a systems failure a billion watts are removed from the grid [8], occasionally for extended periods. This gives rise to doubt, concerning their added value when it comes to improving the overall energy security.
The second argument is that renewables need flexible complementary capacity; increasing integration of renewables into the energy mix requires the support of medium-load complementary facilities set up in load-following capacity, not the presence of large, inflexible NPPs. However, dr. Lambertz, CEO of RWE Power, is of the mind that the growing energy demand cannot be met by the mass grid integration of renewables at the moment and that conventional power plants will still have a role to play in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, he stipulates that the continued development of renewables will be reflected in greater price volatility following the increased variability in power plant dispatch [15]. Table 2.1 provides an example of one of the challenges facing power plants and system operators; the typically large differences in the availability of renewable energy sources, in this case wind energy.
In Germany, for example, renewable system operators are statutorily entitled to a priority connection from the grid operator over fossil fuel powered energy stations (Renewable Energy Sources Act, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 5(1)). Effective this means that when there is very little demand and an abundant production of renewable resources, conventional power sources, such as nuclear, will need to scale back their production in order avoid financial consequences. In the first weekend of October 2009 this resulted in NPP operators having to pay €500 per mega-watt hour for their electricity to be taken off. However, Lambertz argues that the direct opposite situation can have equally devastating consequences. On the 6th of January 2010 only 300 MWe, out of an installed capacity of 25.800 MWe of wind turbines, was feeding electricity into the grid. In other words only 1.2% of the installed capacity could be used [15]. The same fluctuation profile can be applied to solar power generation. It has been reported that, in the period from February to July 2009, on average only 728 MWe was available per week, while the installed capacity at the time was roughly 9.5 GWe [15].
[Although dated, the author has an interesting approach to the issues. Read on ...]