Aoki and Rothwell reported in 2013 that the causes, responses, and consequences of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (March 2011) by comparing these with Three Mile Island (March 1979) and Chernobyl (April 1986). The authors identified three generic modes of organizational coordination: modular, vertical, and horizontal. By relying on comparative institutional analysis, they compared the modes' performance characteristics in terms of short-term and long-term coordination, preparedness for shocks, and responsiveness to shocks. They derived general lessons, including the identification of three shortcomings of integrated Japanese electric utilities:
1) decision instability that can lead to system failure after a large shock,
2) poor incentives to innovate, and
3) the lack of defense-in-depth strategies for accidents.
The authors' suggested policy response is to introduce an independent Nuclear Safety Commission, and an Independent System Operator to coordinate buyers and sellers on publicly owned transmission grids. Without an independent safety regulator, or a very well established "safety culture," profit-maximizing behavior by an entrenched electricity monopoly will not necessarily lead to a social optimum with regard to nuclear power plant safety. All countries considering continued operation or expansion of their nuclear power industries must strive to establish independent, competent, and respected safety regulators, or prepare for nuclear power plant accidents.
The authors concluded that the the most recent experience at the Fukushima nuclear disaster [Note: Not a "disaster" because no one was killed or irradiated. It was an "accident" or even "incident" caused by the tsunami]. However, the authors' intention was to review and to derive general lessons from it for making the electric power industry more efficient, safer, and innovative. Particularly, the scrutiny of fundamental cause of the Fukushima nuclear "accident" and subsequent, on-going transformation of Japan’s power industry may hopefully offer valuable lessons for countries such as China, where two-dozen nuclear power plants are being built, and more than 100 plants are being planned, yet there is no clear-cut institutional separation between safety regulation and industrial plan implementation [(Rothwell, 2003) - Look for possible bias in this publication].
Comparing Japanese and Chinese nuclear safety regulatory requirements, Japan’s nuclear industry uses (either in operation or active construction before March 2011) 1 reactor type (light water reactors, LWRs) with 2 nuclear suppliers of Boiling Water Reactors, BWRs, and Pressurized Water Reactors, PWRs, with 8 reactor models (BWR-2: 1; BWR-3: 2; BWR-4: 5; BWR-5: 18;ABWR: 6; PWR-2 loop: 8; PWR-3 loop: 9; and PWR-4 loop: 7). The Japanese nuclear safety regulator has not been able to effectively regulate (e.g., in re-licensing) older models with one or two units, such as the BWR-2 with one unit (Tsuruga-1 connected to the transmission grid since November 1969) and BWR-3 with two units, Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 among them.[Note: Why not? No reasons provided]
On the other hand, China’s nuclear industry uses 2 reactor types (LWRs and heavy water reactors, HWRs, with helium gas reactors under development) with 5 nuclear suppliers (Canadian HWRs, Chinese PWRs, French PWRs, Japanese–American PWRs, and Russian PWRs) with 7 reactor models (Canadian CANDU: 2; Chinese Nuclear Plant, CNP-300 MWe: 1; CNP-600: 6; CNP-1000: 24; French European Pressurized Reactor, EPR: 2; Japanese– Westinghouse Advanced Passive-1000: 4; and the Russian VVER: 2).
With so many reactor types and suppliers, China’s nuclear power industry has had much technology transfer, but its nuclear safety regulator will have its hands full with so many orphaned units.[Note: Why? No reasons for this statement either? Vague, without foundation] Unless China, as well as other countries where new nuclear power plants are being or will be built, establishes a strongly independent and highly professional nuclear safety commission, its quest for safe nuclear power could be derailed by another accident.
[They did provide some suggestions for improvement:
- review damage to Fukushima Dai-Ichi on March 11, 2011, from the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
- find that delays in coordinated action led to a cascading series of accidents at Fukushima.
- suggest unbundling of the publicly purchased Tokyo Electric Power to pay for accident damages.
- suggest the creation of a Japanese Independent System Operator to manage unbundled transmission assets.
- propose establishing an open-interface, rule-based independent nuclear regulator in Japan. ]
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