Bruno Tertrais opined in 2014 that France’s recent military interventions in Africa have once again led commentators to wonder how much the need to guarantee access to local uranium resources is part of Paris’ calculus about such operations. There is no evidence to support this. While Niger remains a prominent source of uranium for France, its importance has diminished in recent years.
In France, natural uranium is immediately associated with the relationship to African countries. Uranium has always fed rumors, fantasies and conspiracy theories set against the background of all the colorful stories of what is known in France as the “Françafrique”; the web of personal and economic relations between Paris and its former colonies. Uranium from Niger was in the news a decade ago when it was alleged that Iraq had sought to import natural uranium from there. Since early 2013, new French interventions in Mali and in the Central African Republic have led many to wonder what role, if any, the security of strategic supplies has played in French strategy, in particular of uranium mines developed by Areva in Niger.
Areva’s operations in Niger have been highly visible in recent years. French nationals working for Areva have been among a number of workers taken hostage by terrorists. Following the beginning of the Serval operation in Mali, Paris made it known that its special forces would contribute to the security of Areva’s operations in Niger, an exceptional measure. However, it would be a considerable stretch to suggest that French military interventions in Mali and Central Africa were triggered by the need to protect Areva’s mining sites. Those sites are nearly 2,000 kilometres away from either Bamako or Bangui. In fact, although uranium from Niger remains important for Areva, it is not as important for the French national nuclear program as many believe.
France’s recent military interventions in Africa have once again led commentators to wonder how much the need to guarantee access to local uranium resources is part of Paris’ calculus about such operations. There is no evidence to support this. While Niger remains a prominent source of uranium for France, its importance has diminished in recent years. In fact, in recent years Niger has ranked only second or third among EDF main suppliers, behind countries such as Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan. As is also the case for other African countries (Namibia and South Africa), they
have been near the bottom of the list.
It is true that the total quantity of natural uranium imported by France comes first mostly from Niger (more than 5,000 tonnes in 2012) followed by Kazakhstan, Australia, Uzbekistan, and Namibia. But that is because Niger remains today an important part of Areva’s business as a global company. Because France also exports uranium (raw and processed), it often imports much more than just the 8000 tonnes a year that are needed for EDF power plants. Thus, from 2006 to 2012, total French imports have ranged from 8,000 to 14,000 tonnes a year. The extent of Areva’s future activities in Niger (as well as in Gabon, where it has exploration activities) will be largely dependent on the costs of mining, transportation and security. Such costs will be balanced against revenue, which depends on the market price and negotiations with local partners. By its own account, in the past 40 years Areva
has gained only 13% of the revenues of its exploitation of Nigerien uranium (against 70% for the Nigerien state and
2% for foreign partners).
In fact, after having heavily invested in the opening of a giant new open-pit mining site at Imouraren, Areva is now said to be considering closing down its operations in Niger altogether. These may be just rumors, aimed for instance at putting pressure on the Nigerien government, which is said to be asking for more benefits from the French firm. However, it would not be surprising if, given the combination of a structurally low market price and of difficult
political and strategic conditions in Niger, Areva were not at least seriously reconsidering its overall strategy in Africa. As for the Central African Republic, Areva stopped conducting exploration activities there in 2012.
The author concluded that:
• In light of growing instability in the Sahel region, France should continue to diversify its imports of natural uranium.
• French firms Areva and EDF should be encouraged to communicate regularly and publicly about the annual amounts of natural uranium they import from former French colonies and the share it represents of all fuel for nuclear power plants.
Original working URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep13277.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A702ccea1b5ee42fb65db7c42c5818a25
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